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1HOW BIG MONEY RUINED PUBLIC LIFE IN 
WISCONSIN
LYNN ADELMAN*
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses how Wisconsin fell from grace. Once a model good 
government state that pioneered many democracy-enhancing laws, in a very short 
time, Wisconsin became a state where special interest money, most of which is 
undisclosed, dominates politics. This Article identifies several factors as being critical 
to Wisconsin’s descent. These include the state’s failure to nurture and build on the 
campaign finance reforms enacted in the 1970s and both the state’s and the United 
States Supreme Court’s failure to adequately regulate sham issue ads. As evidence of 
Wisconsin’s diminished status, this Article describes how several of the state’s most 
progressive laws have been undermined and how each of the three branches of the 
state’s government has been beset by scandal related to the increased importance of 
special interest money. Finally, this Article suggests that major change will come 
about only in the long term; such change will require both new campaign finance 
reforms and a shift in approach by the United States Supreme Court.
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I. THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORMS ENACTED IN THE 1970S WORKED 
From the standpoint of good government, Wisconsin was once a model state, often 
in the forefront of governmental reform. During the era of Fighting Bob LaFollette, 
Wisconsin pioneered a range of innovative democracy-enhancing measures, including 
referendum, recall, direct election of United States senators, and campaign finance 
reform legislation.1 In 1905, the Wisconsin legislature banned corporations from 
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making financial contributions to political candidates.2 And in 1911, fourteen years 
prior to the federal government, the Wisconsin legislature passed a Corrupt Practices 
Act.3 The Act was a sweeping reform that barred political candidates from trading 
favors for contributions and also required candidates to report the sources of their
campaign funding.4
By the early 1970s, the need for additional campaign finance reform legislation 
became apparent.5 A reform movement commenced,6 fueled principally by the ideas 
of John Gardner’s fledgling national organization, Common Cause.7 When news of 
the Watergate scandal8 broke, the campaign finance reform effort gained traction.9
Beginning in 1973, over a period of four years, the Wisconsin legislature enacted 
comprehensive campaign finance reform legislation.10 The reforms were based on the 
following principles: (1) all political spending had to go through committees registered 
with the newly created bi-partisan Elections Board, which was responsible for 
administering the law; (2) contributions to candidate committees, political party 
committees, and political action committees (“PACs”) had to be fully disclosed to the 
public, as did expenditures for political purposes; (3) individuals and committees were 
subject to contribution limits; and (4) a system of partial public financing of campaigns 
was created with spending limits for participating candidates.11
                                                          
1 SUZANNE NOVAK & SHEEMA SHAH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN 
WISCONSIN 2 (2007),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48578.pdf.
2 WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2001–2002 894 
(2001).
3 Corrupt Practices Act, 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 883.
4 CAROLE J. HYNEK, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, WISCONSIN BRIEF 01-9, CAMPAIGN 
FINANCING IN WISCONSIN 1 (2001),
http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16831coll2/id/1079/rec/4.
5 See id. at 1–2.
6 See id.
7 See Rebecca Curry, Making Law with Lawsuits: Understanding Judicial Review in 
Campaign Finance Policy, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 389, 403–04 (2013).
8 “In May 1972, as evidence would later show, members of Nixon’s Committee to Re-
Elect the President (known derisively as CREEP) broke into the Democratic National 
Committee’s Watergate headquarters, stole copies of top-secret documents and bugged the 
office’s phones.” Watergate Scandal, HISTORY.COM (2009),
http://www.history.com/topics/watergate.
9 See generally Gail Shea, Musings on the Arc of Campaign Finance Reform 2 (n.d.) 
(unpublished paper) (on file with author).
10 See Act of Oct. 20, 1977, ch. 107, § 44, 1977 Wis. Sess. Law 595, repealed by 2011 
Wisconsin Act 32, § 13vb, 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 139; Act of July 6, 1974, ch. 334, § 34, 1973 
Wis. Sess. Laws 1057, repealed and replaced by 2015 Wisconsin Act 117, § 24, 2015 Wis. 
Sess. Laws 836. 
11 See Act of Oct. 20, 1977, ch. 107, § 44 (creating partial public financing for political 
campaigns); Act of July 6, 1974, ch. 334, § 34.
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The purpose of the legislation was to limit the influence of money in electoral 
politics. The rationale was that the more candidates had to worry about raising large 
amounts of money to secure an election, the more likely the decisions they made once 
in office would be influenced by the sources of their financial support as opposed to 
the public interest. As the statute’s declaration of policy stated: “When the true source 
of support or extent of support is not fully disclosed, or when a candidate becomes 
overly dependent upon large private contributors, the democratic process is subjected 
to a potential corrupting influence.”12
The same concern served as the basis for the statute’s public funding provisions.
The notion was that if candidates could fund their campaigns through a combination 
of small contributions and public grants, they would be less likely to be beholden to 
private interests while in office.13 The Wisconsin legislature thus recognized that in a 
democratic society, a systemic tension exists between the interests of the majority and 
the interests of the rich and powerful. The question was how to create a healthy balance 
between these interests; on one hand, the power of the majority could be used unfairly 
against those with substantial financial resources. On the other hand, the wealthy could 
use their money to dominate governmental decision-making.14 Therefore, creating
strong, democratic institutions was necessary to balance these competing interests. 
Campaign finance regulation was thought to be one such institution.15
The public funding dimension of the reform legislation was designed to conform 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo in which the Court held that a 
state legislature could impose spending limits on a political campaign only if it made 
public funding available and the candidate accepted such funding. 16 Thus, the 
legislature created the Wisconsin Elections Campaign Fund (“WECF”) to provide 
public funding for candidates running for almost all state offices in contested general 
elections.17 To be eligible for a public grant, a candidate had to raise a threshold 
amount in contributions of $100 or less and receive at least 6% of the vote in the 
primary election.18 Like the system used to finance presidential general election 
campaigns, the WECF funds were generated through a checkoff on income tax returns;
individual taxpayers could indicate that $1 of their tax liability be directed to the 
WECF.19
                                                          
12 WIS. STAT. § 11.001 (2002).
13 WIS. STAT. § 11.01 (2014); PAUL ONSAGER, WIS. LEGIS. FISCAL BUREAU,
INFORMATIONAL PAPER 1, PUBLIC FINANCING OF CAMPAIGNS IN WISCONSIN 2 (2009),
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/informational-
papers/documents/2009/95_public%20financing%20of%20campaigns%20in%20wi_po.pdf.
14 See id.
15 Shea, supra note 9, at 1.
16 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 99 (1976).
17 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws at 595.
18 WIS. STAT. § 11.50 (2010); Kenneth R. Mayer & John M. Wood, The Impact of Public 
Financing on Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964–1990, 20 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 69, 72 (1995).
19 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws at 599; Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 83.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
4 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1
Candidates could obtain funds from the WECF equal to 45% of the spending limit 
for the office they sought.20 Because the purpose of public funding was to reduce 
candidate dependence on special interest contributions, the public grant was reduced 
by a dollar for every dollar of PAC money a candidate accepted.21 To encourage 
candidates to accept public funding, a candidate whose opponent declined public 
funding was not required to abide by the statutory spending limits.22 Later, for the 
same reason, the Wisconsin legislature added a provision that authorized a candidate 
facing a non-participating opponent to receive the non-participating opponent’s public 
grant.23
In addition to making it less likely that substantive issues such as education, 
healthcare, and taxation would not be excessively influenced by moneyed interests, 
public funding provided other benefits. For example, it helped ensure that citizens with 
limited means could run for public office. Public funding also enabled elected officials 
to spend more time focusing on substantive issues.24 Ultimately, however, the main 
purpose of providing public funding to candidates was to reduce the nexus between 
access to wealth and electoral success. As former Arizona governor Janet Napolitano 
once explained, her executive order creating a discount prescription drug program was 
directly connected to Arizona’s public funding system in that public funding made her 
less concerned about the financial power of the pharmaceutical industry.25
For approximately a dozen years, Wisconsin’s campaign finance reform
legislation worked well. About 20% of Wisconsin taxpayers participated in the income
tax checkoff. As a result, the WECF had enough money to provide all participating 
candidates with the full public grant of 45% of the spending limit.26 Further, 
approximately three-fourths of all candidates participated in the public funding 
system.27 This large-scale participation had a significant effect on overall campaign 
spending.
The increase in campaign spending was much smaller in Wisconsin in the post-
reform years than it was in other states.28 Between 1978 and 1990, the average 
spending by Wisconsin incumbents rose by a little more than 120% in senate races.29
Comparatively, in roughly the same period, spending in senate races rose in California 
by 286%, in Oregon by 379%, and in Nebraska by 308%.30 Also, the gap between 
incumbent and challenger spending remained relatively narrow, with Wisconsin 
                                                          
20 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws at 598; Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 73.
21 WIS. STAT. § 11.509 (2010).
22 Id. § 11.512.
23 Id. § 11.509; 2002 Wis. Sess. Laws 1022.
24 NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 4.
25 Id. at 6.
26 Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 79–80.
27 NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 14.
28 Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 73.
29 NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 14.
30 Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 79–80.
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challengers spending 70% to 80% of what incumbents spent, a far better record than 
in other states.31
Additionally, the Wisconsin campaign finance reform legislation effectively 
limited the role of special interest groups. In 1990, for example, PAC contributions 
constituted only 13.5% of the total amount raised in legislative campaigns.32 In 
contrast, in other states, such as Michigan and Oregon, interest groups accounted for 
between 60% and 75% of legislative campaign contributions.33
The other features of the legislation also worked well. The disclosure provision 
required candidates to disclose all “contributions in excess of $20, including the 
occupation and employer of any contributor whose cumulative contributions for the 
calendar year exceeded $100.”34 And while contribution limits for some elected offices 
were relatively high, the Wisconsin legislature limited individual and PAC 
contributions to $500 for state assembly candidates and $1000 for senate candidates.35
Further, leaders of both the Republican and Democratic parties appointed 
individuals to the Elections Board who were committed to fair and nonpartisan 
enforcement of the law.36 Thus, Wisconsin’s campaign finance reform legislation
succeeded in limiting the influence of special interest money in electoral politics. The 
system created by the reform legislation also developed considerable bipartisan
support.37 Not incidentally, the years in which the system flourished were among the 
most productive in state history; the Wisconsin legislature enacted important 
legislation concerning a broad range of subjects.38
Therefore, the first lesson learned from Wisconsin’s experience is that campaign 
finance reform legislation can work and accomplish its intended purposes. As
discussed, the law worked well and political actors and the press paid close attention 
to it. Questionable conduct was brought to the attention of the Elections Board, and 
the public was kept well-informed about campaign finance issues. Some 
commentators cynically observe that campaign finance reform legislation must 
inevitably fail because money will always find a way to influence politics.39 Yet
                                                          
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 7; see WIS. STAT. § 11.06 (2010).
35 Novak & Shah, supra note 1, at 7.
36 See id. at 15.
37 Shea, supra note 9, at 2.
38 See 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 725 (automobile lemon law); id. at 1153 (a groundbreaking 
marital property law); 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 643 (creation of a Citizens Utility Board); id. at 
901 (protection of gays and lesbians from discrimination in employment, housing and public 
accommodation); id. at 1378 (substantial revisions to the state fair employment law); id. at 1387 
(an open records law); 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 412 (creation of the Public Defender’s Office); id.
at 567 (no fault divorce law); id. at 728 (creating a uniform classification system of criminal 
offenses, including decriminalizing several offenses); id. at 1216 (lobbying reform); 1973 Wis. 
Sess. Laws 186 (laws regarding a code of ethics for public officials).
39 Steve Gillman, Why Bother with Campaign Finance Reform?, HUFFPOST: THE BLOG
(Dec. 23, 2012 11:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-gillman/campaign-finance-
reform_b_2001074.html.
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Wisconsin’s experience, as well as the experiences of many other jurisdictions, such 
as New York City, demonstrates that a well-constructed system can produce good 
results.40
II. BUT WISCONSIN FAILED TO NURTURE THE REFORMS
In the late 1980s and thereafter, Wisconsin’s positive experience with campaign 
finance reform began to change. Partisanship intensified, and Elections Board 
appointees focused more on protecting their party’s candidates than the public 
interest.41 Even worse, Board members began to collude to thwart enforcement of the 
law. For example, the Board stopped conducting random audits of campaign finance 
reports and refused to require campaign committees to reconcile their financial reports 
with bank statements.42 Without these checks on the veracity of campaign finance 
reports, public disclosure essentially became voluntary. The Board also precluded its
staff from investigating complaints of law violations. In one instance, the Board 
squashed a complaint against a committee claiming to be an independent entity 
making lawful expenditures when that committee was actually a county political 
party.43
The Wisconsin legislature also weakened contribution limits applicable to party 
committees and PACs by allowing them to set up “conduits” that enabled them to 
report interest group contributions as if they were from individuals.44 In addition, the 
legislature approved the establishment of leadership PACs, known as legislative 
campaign committees. These committees quickly became vehicles for raising large 
sums of special interest money.45
The legislature’s most serious error was its failure to support public funding. It did 
not promote or increase the $1 income tax checkoff, and it did not designate another 
source of public funding.46 As a result, the money in the WECF diminished, and the 
                                                          
40 See ELISABETH GENN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DONOR DIVERSITY THROUGH 
PUBLIC MATCHING FUNDS 6, 16 (2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/DonorDiversityReport_
WEB.PDF (describing the New York City small donor program); SUZANNE NOVAK & PAIGE 
AMMONS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN MINNESOTA 4, 7 (2007),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48578.pdf 
[hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN MINNESOTA]; SUZANNE NOVAK & LAUREN JONES, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN MICHIGAN 4, 7 (2007),
http://www.mcfn.org/pdfs/reports/Brennan_MI_48220.pdf [hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN 
MICHIGAN]; SUZANNE NOVAK, MANEESH SHARMA & BETHAN FOSTER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN OHIO 4 (2007),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48229.pdf 
[hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN OHIO].
41 See Shea, supra note 9, at 2.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See WIS. STAT. § 11.38 (2010); Shea, supra note 9, at 2. 
45 Shea, supra note 9, at 2.
46 WIS. LEGIS. FISCAL BUREAU, DEMOCRACY TRUST FUND (GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
BOARD, GENERAL FUND TAXES, MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS, AND STATE TREASURER) 4
(2011), 
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public grants available to candidates had to be pro-rated.47 The Wisconsin legislature
also declined to increase spending limits to keep pace with inflation.48
For public funding to work, spending limits must be high enough for candidates to 
realistically compete for the office they seek. Otherwise, candidates will not 
participate in the public funding system. By 2004, the average amount spent by state 
senate candidates in Wisconsin was $93,000.49 This amount was more than two and a 
half times the spending limit, and few candidates participated in public funding.50 In 
contrast, Minnesota enacted a campaign finance system mirroring Wisconsin’s, but 
Minnesota’s system increased the income tax checkoff to $5, gave taxpayers a partisan 
option, and authorized the use of general fund revenue to supplement checkoff 
proceeds.51 Minnesota’s ongoing efforts to make its public funding system work 
succeeded in many respects, and to this day the system enjoys a high rate of candidate 
participation.52
But why did the Democrats, who had enacted the reforms and had been in the 
majority ever since, let the system atrophy? To some extent, it was a case of state
legislators putting what they believed was in their personal interest ahead of any 
loyalty they may have had to campaign finance reform.53 One legislator, for example, 
who was contemplating running for governor, thought that keeping spending limits 
low would benefit him.54 Other legislators declined to support public funding because 
it attracted opponents who otherwise would not have run for public office.55 And 
others wanted to present themselves as fiscal conservatives unwilling to spend tax 
dollars on political campaigns.56
Many Democratic legislators, however, just became too comfortable raising 
money from special interest groups, particularly business interests.57 They failed to 
recognize that competing with Republicans for business campaign contributions was 
a game they were ultimately going to lose. Similarly, they failed to perceive that by 
                                                          
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/budget/2011_13_biennial_budget/102_budget_paper
s/331_government_accountaiblity_board_democracy_trust_fund.pdf.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 WIS. STAT. § 11.31 (2004); Kenneth R. Mayer, Wisconsin Campaign Finance Project
(2007), https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/10439 (showing 
that the spending limit in 2004 was $34,500 for both the primary and general election).
50 Mayer, supra note 49.
51 CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN MINNESOTA, supra note 40, at 14.
52 Id. at 17.
53 Doug Mell, Around the Limit? Governor’s Spending May Test Election Law, WIS. ST. J.,
May 20, 1990, 1990 WLMR 3085100.
54 Id.
55 HERBERT ALEXANDER, REFORM AND REALITY: THE FINANCING OF STATE AND LOCAL 
CAMPAIGNS 46 (1991).
56 Pocan and Risser Tout Public Funding Plan, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, 2001 WLNR
8783934.
57 Shea, supra note 9, at 3.
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making special interest money less important, campaign finance reform was in their 
party’s long-term interest.
Traditionally, the Democratic Party’s main strength has been its connection to 
large numbers of people, primarily low- and middle-income wage earners. In the late 
1980s, however, Wisconsin Democrats did little to draw on this strength.58 Instead, 
they relied heavily on money provided by business interests59 and failed to nurture the 
campaign finance reforms of the 1970s. Their success at playing the money game was 
short-lived, and a few years later, the Republicans won big majorities in both houses 
of the Wisconsin legislature.60
Some of the Democrats’ natural allies, such as the Wisconsin Education 
Association (“WEAC”), the state’s wealthiest union, similarly miscalculated. Instead 
of mobilizing its members and others with an interest in education, such as parents, 
WEAC based its election strategy on independent expenditures.61 WEAC focused on 
narrow teacher pocketbook issues, came into campaigns in the last several weeks, and 
spent large sums of money on negative television advertisements.62 Further, WEAC
repeatedly used the threat of this kind of spending in its lobbying efforts.63 One effect 
of this approach was that Republicans became fearful of WEAC’s last minute 
spending and less supportive of statutory spending limits.64 Republicans concluded, 
not without justification, that they needed more money to defend themselves.65 Thus,
WEAC’s strategy accelerated an independent spending war.66 Business interests 
quickly adopted WEAC’s approach, and in a very short time, far exceeded WEAC in 
campaign spending.67
Thus, the second important lesson from Wisconsin’s experience with campaign 
finance reform is that a system of campaign finance regulation will only thrive if it is 
continually nurtured. Such systems are inherently fragile and subject to pressures from
a variety of sources, including elected officials who find campaign finance reform
inconvenient and interest groups that seek political influence. Supporters of campaign 
finance reform must work unceasingly to strengthen the regulatory systems they 
create. Constant vigilance is necessary, and Wisconsin Democrats did not provide it.
III. AND WISCONSIN ALSO FAILED TO REGULATE SHAM ISSUE ADS 
The second major reason for the demise of campaign finance reform in Wisconsin 
was the proliferation of sham issue ads. These are the now ubiquitous television
                                                          
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2013–2014 258 
(2013).
61 Shea, supra note 9, at 3.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 Doug Mell, Thompson Lifts Election Spending Lid, WIS. ST. J., Aug. 24, 1990, 1990 
WLNR 3077984.
67 Shea, supra note 9, at 3.
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advertisements that generally say something negative about a candidate, but, instead 
of telling viewers how to vote, advise viewers to call the candidate and express their
opinion. Prior to the advent of sham issue ads, candidates running for public office in 
Wisconsin controlled their own campaigns.68 Les Aspin, former Wisconsin 
Congressman and United States Secretary of Defense, once said that Wisconsin was a 
wonderful state for someone who wanted to run for office; the state was politically 
competitive, political parties were relatively weak, and there were no power-brokers 
whose blessing a candidate had to receive.69 As Aspin put it, if someone wanted to run 
for office in Wisconsin, the candidate only had to recruit some volunteers, find 
somebody to help raise money, and start ringing doorbells.70
This political climate began to change in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Special 
interest groups with substantial resources began to make independent expenditures 
and, because of the large sums of money that these groups had, candidates had to be 
prepared to deal with them.71 Further, in 1996, another spending pipeline opened. This 
one involved a particularly insidious kind of independent expenditure, sham issue 
ads.72 The state’s largest business association, Wisconsin Manufacturers and 
Commerce (“WMC”), spent substantial amounts of money on such ads, most of which 
involved political attacks on Democratic candidates.73 WMC believed that because 
these ads did not direct viewers how to vote, they were not “express advocacy”74 under 
Buckley and thus were not subject to campaign finance regulations.75 The possibility 
of being able to engage in unregulated political spending was attractive to WMC.76 If 
spending were unregulated, WMC could pay for its ads with corporate money which,
under Wisconsin law, was money WMC could not otherwise spend for political 
purposes.77 Further, WMC would not have to identify its contributors.78
I was in the Wisconsin State Senate when WMC began spending money on sham 
issue ads and had the unpleasant experience of being one of the ads’ first targets. I was
initially elected in 1976 when Les Aspin’s description of running for office in 
Wisconsin remained accurate. I recruited a few volunteers, started running, got a few
good breaks (shortly before the election, my opponent was convicted of a felony), and 
was ultimately elected. I was fortunate enough to be re-elected to five four-year terms.
                                                          
68 WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN, From Sunlight to Darkness: The Demise of Campaign 
Finance Disclosure in Wisconsin (Apr. 7, 2004), http://www.wisdc.org/suntodark.php.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 HYNEK, supra note 4, at 7.
74 Express advocacy refers to political advertisements that clearly support or oppose a 
particular electoral outcome. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43–44 (1976).
75 See Elections Bd. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 597 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Wis. 1999).
76 HYNEK, supra note 4, at 7.
77 See id.
78 See WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN, supra note 68.
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
10 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1
In all of my campaigns, I participated in public funding, and in the first three, my 
opponent did as well. Not until 1992 did candidate spending even approach $100,000 
apiece. Further, in my first five campaigns, no independent group participated.79 In 
1996, however, WMC budgeted $250,000 to broadcast a sham issue ad on Milwaukee 
television in the last two weeks of the campaign. The ad stated:
State Senator Lynn Adelman is standing in the way of reform. Voting 
against curbs on frivolous lawsuits that cost Milwaukee jobs. What’s 
worse, Adelman’s made a career of putting the rights of criminals ahead of 
the rights of victims: Voting to deny employers the right to keep convicted
felons out of the workplace. That’s wrong. That’s liberal. But that’s Lynn 
Adelman. Call Lynn Adelman. Tell him honest working people have rights 
too.80
As indicated, sham issue ads were new in Wisconsin, and I was unsure of how to 
handle the situation. Independent campaigns subject to campaign finance rules, such 
as full public disclosure, contribution limits, and prohibitions on corporate 
contributions, were lawful, but WMC was not engaging in that kind of independent 
campaign.81 WMC argued that its sham issue ad was not a campaign ad at all because 
it did not contain express advocacy.82
I thought the ad was a campaign ad because its purpose was to elect my opponent. 
To me, no other reasonable interpretation of the ad was possible because the ad 
identified me by name, criticized me, ran just before the election, and appeared only
on stations watched by voters in my district.83 The notion that the purpose of the ad 
was to educate voters about issues seemed preposterous. Thus, as I saw it, WMC 
violated the law by using corporate money to pay for the ad (which I did not know for 
sure but thought highly likely) and by not disclosing the identity of its contributors. I 
also worried that if I could not get the ad off the air, I might lose the election because 
I was a Democrat representing a heavily Republican district and had won by only 1%
of the vote in the last election four years earlier.84
I concluded that I had no alternative but to file a lawsuit against WMC and the 
television stations broadcasting the ad. I brought an action in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court seeking to enjoin further broadcast of the ad (which had started to run) 
on the ground that it violated Wisconsin’s campaign finance law. I simultaneously 
filed a complaint with the Elections Board. Judge Patricia McMahon rejected WMC’s 
argument that the ad was not express advocacy and enjoined further broadcast of it.85
After I filed suit, other Democratic candidates who were the targets of similar 
WMC ads elsewhere in the state filed complaints. Courts subsequently enjoined all of 
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WMC’s ads from further broadcast.86 An intermediate appellate court affirmed the 
injunctions.87 And in 1999, the matter went to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.88 By that 
time, however, I no longer controlled the case because the Elections Board had 
brought its own suit, and its suit became the case that the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
considered.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ducked the question of whether WMC’s sham issue 
ads constituted express advocacy under Buckley, but encouraged the Elections Board 
to adopt new rules that better defined the forms of advocacy that were subject to 
campaign finance regulation. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley wrote a dissenting opinion, 
joined by Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson. The Justices dissented from the court’s 
refusal to address the express advocacy question and set forth a test for determining 
whether an ad constituted express advocacy.89 In their view, the court needed to
consider the ad’s essential nature: 
Is it one that merely discusses issues, and in the process discusses 
candidates inextricably linked to those issues, or is it one that advocates 
some action for or against a candidate but does so under the guise of 
discussing issues? . . . Under such a standard, there can be no doubt that . . 
. . [t]he essential nature of these advertisements is candidate advocacy, not 
issue advocacy. These advertisements mention issues only as a vehicle of 
propping up or tearing down a particular candidate. Take away references 
to the candidates and precious little, if anything, would remain of the 
advertisement.90
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to resolve the sham issue ad problem,
the Wisconsin legislature and the Elections Board similarly failed. The collective 
result of these failures was that spending on such ads increased astronomically, and 
sham issue ads became the most important form of political advertising in 
Wisconsin.91 In 1998, an explosion of sham issue ad spending contributed to producing 
Wisconsin’s first million dollar state senate race.92 In 2000, special interest groups 
spent $2.3 million, and candidates spent an additional $700,000 in a senate race in 
rural Wisconsin.93 In 2002, the amount of money spent on sham issue ads far exceeded 
independent expenditures by committees subject to public disclosure requirements and 
contribution limits.94 In 2006, special interest groups spent approximately $15 million 
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on sham issue ads, more than triple the amount spent in 2002.95 Since then, spending 
on sham issue ads has only continued to increase.96
Currently, special interest groups and wealthy contributors (including individuals 
and corporations) favor sham issue ads because they are unregulated, and the public 
can be kept in the dark about who is paying for them.97 Thus, dark money dominates 
almost every high spending election in Wisconsin.98 Candidate committees, which are 
subject to contribution limits and public disclosure requirements, are rarely able to
match the amount of money raised for unregulated expenditures. Therefore, the third 
important lesson from Wisconsin’s experience with campaign finance reform is that 
to be effective, campaign finance legislation must regulate sham issue ads.
IV. THE CORRUPTING EFFECT OF WISCONSIN’S REGULATORY FAILURE
By the early 2000s, the campaign finance reform legislation that Wisconsin 
pioneered in the 1970s had, for the most part, been rendered irrelevant, and the halcyon 
days of Wisconsin politics that Les Aspin described were long gone.99 The breakdown 
of the reform legislation resulted in an explosion of special interest spending and an
enormous increase in the importance of political money.100 And the result of 
Wisconsin’s regulatory failure has been grave damage to the public life of the state.
For example, voters in Wisconsin now have fewer electoral choices than they once 
had because fewer people run for public office.101 In 1970, not a single legislative race 
was uncontested, whereas by 2002, 50% of the candidates for legislative office ran 
unopposed.102
Furthermore, the increased importance of money in state elections has adversely 
affected the functioning of the Wisconsin legislature. Wisconsin was once known for 
its independent legislators.103 It was a place where mavericks thrived. Former U.S. 
Senator Bill Proxmire, for example, who was re-elected to the Senate in 1982 after 
spending less than $150 on his campaign, got his start in the Wisconsin Assembly.104
However, as money became more important in the electoral process, legislative power 
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became increasingly centralized.105 Legislative leaders now control most legislative 
fundraising as well as the allocation of funds to candidates.106 And few, if any, 
mavericks remain.
The demise of campaign finance reform also led to the diminution of Wisconsin’s 
status as a model good government state. Increased campaign spending was one of 
several factors that contributed to the Republican Party’s takeover of the state
legislature.107 Regrettably, the GOP’s stewardship of Wisconsin’s good government 
tradition has been less than exemplary. In 2015, the non-partisan Center for Public 
Integrity gave Wisconsin an overall grade of “D” on its national report card on 
government transparency and accountability.108 Further, it gave Wisconsin grades of 
“F” in public access to information, political financing, and legislative 
accountability.109
Some examples of the legislature’s recent work demonstrate why Wisconsin 
received these grades. In 2010, the legislature enacted one of the worst partisan 
gerrymanders in modern American history.110 More recently, working with the 
Governor, legislative leaders attempted to undo Wisconsin’s long-standing 
commitment to transparency in government by inserting a last minute amendment into 
the state budget that gutted the state’s open records law.111 The legislature withdrew 
the amendment only because of a public outcry led by the media.112
The legislature also eliminated Wisconsin’s watchdog agency, the Government 
Accountability Board (“GAB”), a non-partisan body consisting of six retired judges 
that was created to take over the duties of the Elections and Ethics Boards.113 A well-
known election law expert referred to the GAB as “a model for the nation.”114
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Wisconsin’s largest newspaper opined that the GAB was eliminated to create “a 
watchdog with no teeth.”115 In addition, the legislature made investigating political 
corruption more difficult for prosecutors,116 weakened the public disclosure 
requirement and other provisions of the state’s campaign finance law,117 and 
diminished long-standing civil service protections for state employees.118
Further, the demise of campaign finance reform legislation, along with the 
increased importance of political money, harmed public life in Wisconsin in yet 
another way. It led to the emergence of a phenomenon, once rare in the state, the major 
political scandal.119 In the last fifteen years, Wisconsin has been beset by three such 
scandals, one involving legislative campaigns, one involving a gubernatorial 
campaign, and one involving campaigns for the Wisconsin Supreme Court and their 
aftermath.120 Wisconsin’s lapse as a good government state and these scandals have 
contributed to increased disrespect for the Wisconsin state government.121 The 
scandals also teach another important lesson: even a model state can be corrupted in a 
very short time.
A. The Legislature’s Caucus Scandal
The first scandal, widely known as the caucus scandal, grew directly out of the 
increased centralization of legislative power and the expansive use of such power to 
raise money for political campaigns.122 Partisan caucus organizations, staffed by state 
employees, were created in the late 1960s to perform public policy research for what 
were generally part-time legislators who had minimal staff support.123 Each party in 
the state assembly and senate had a caucus staff.124 With the ever increasing 
importance of money in politics, however, legislative leaders began to use caucus 
employees to assist in fundraising and related political activity rather than for 
research.125
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Although the unlawful activity of caucus employees was an open secret, neither 
the Elections Board nor the Ethics Board took any action. The full picture did not 
emerge until a part-time political reporter and a local district attorney got involved.126
After a lengthy investigation, legislative leaders of both parties and several legislative 
staffers were charged with numerous felonies and lesser offenses.127
The criminal complaints indicate the centrality of fundraising to the caucus 
scandal. For example, the complaint against Republican Assembly Speaker Scott 
Jensen alleged that Jensen met with the “four horsemen” (the lobbyists from WMC, 
the Farm Bureau, the Builders, and the Realtors)128 and directed them where to send 
their clients’ money and whether they should give it “directly to campaigns or as 
independent expenditures.”129 And, the complaint against Democratic Senate Majority 
Leader Chuck Chvala alleged that he “designed a scheme” to conceal his control of a 
PAC so that his aide, who was presumably running the PAC, would not know of his 
control “and could not be a witness against him.”130
The caucus probe ended in the criminal convictions of six legislators and several
legislative staffers.131 The scandal destroyed the political careers of the convicted 
legislators, and the legislature enacted legislation abolishing the caucuses.132 The 
caucus scandal was a watershed in Wisconsin political history. The intense emphasis 
on money had changed the state’s political culture, and it was difficult to imagine how 
the genie that had been released could be stuffed back into the bottle.133
B. The Governor’s Campaign Coordination Scandal
A few years after the resolution of the final case in the caucus scandal, another 
campaign finance scandal emerged. This scandal involved the activities of Governor 
Scott Walker’s campaign in the 2012 gubernatorial recall election and several 
supposedly independent entities, including WMC and the Wisconsin Club for Growth 
(“WiCFG”).134 This scandal concerned sums of money many orders of magnitude
larger than the amounts involved in the caucus scandal.135 The scandal began to unfold 
when a bipartisan group of district attorneys and the GAB began an investigation into
the potentially unlawful campaign coordination between Walker’s campaign 
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committee and supposed independents.136 Coordinated campaign expenditures are 
generally regarded as in-kind campaign contributions, subject to the same public
disclosure requirements and contribution limits applicable to a candidate’s campaign 
contributions.137
The reason for anti-coordination rules is that if a candidate can coordinate with an 
independent group that, under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United v. FEC,138 can accept secret, unlimited contributions, then contribution and 
disclosure rules that apply to political candidates are meaningless.139 A large 
contribution to a supposedly independent group that coordinated with a candidate 
would have the same effect as a direct contribution to the candidate.140 Furthermore,
because the contribution remained secret, the public would never know whether the 
contributors later received special treatment from the political candidates they 
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supported.141 Thus, anti-coordination rules are one of the few remaining bulwarks 
against a completely lawless campaign finance landscape.142
As a result of the unveiling of information regarding possible unlawful 
coordination between Walker’s campaign committee and supposed independent 
groups, an experienced federal prosecutor with a Republican background was 
appointed to investigate the matter.143 The special prosecutor concluded that Walker’s
campaign and groups such as WiCFG had, in fact, coordinated their political activities 
and violated Wisconsin’s campaign finance laws.144 Specifically, the special 
prosecutor determined that Walker secretly raised millions of dollars for WiCFG and
evaded campaign finance disclosure requirements.145 He concluded that Walker’s staff 
had advised Walker to “stress that donations to WiCFG are not disclosed” and that 
“corporate contributions” could be accepted and are “not reported” when soliciting 
campaign funds.146 In addition, the prosecutor discovered evidence that caused him to 
suspect that the Walker campaign coordinated with groups engaged in express 
advocacy.147
One effect of the alleged Walker/WiCFG coordination scheme was that voters 
were left in the dark about who was influencing elections in Wisconsin and whether 
they might be getting something in return. For example, no campaign finance reports
disclosed to Wisconsin citizens that a Florida-based mining company, which lobbied
for a massive open pit mine in Wisconsin, contributed $700,000 to WiCFG to spend
in support of Walker’s agenda.148 Nor did any reports reveal that John Menard, owner 
of a chain of hardware stores, gave $1.5 million to WiCFG for similar purposes.149
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Voters, therefore, were unable to assess whether Menard’s donation had anything to 
do with his receipt of at least $1.8 million in tax credits from Walker’s job 
development agency.150
The evidence appeared to lead the special prosecutor to conclude that through 
unlawful coordination, WiCFG and other big money groups bankrolled Walker’s 2012 
recall victory.151 WiCFG alone spent at least $9.1 million on Wisconsin’s 2011 and 
2012 recall elections and funneled almost $9.6 million more to other groups, including 
WMC, that supported the re-election efforts.152
WiCFG and other groups whose activity the special prosecutor was investigating
launched an aggressive legal and public relations campaign to discredit the 
investigation.153 Their legal contention was that Wisconsin could not apply its anti-
coordination rules to them because the money they spent in coordination with 
Walker’s campaign was spent on issue ads that the State could not regulate consistent 
with the First Amendment.154 They brought this argument to the federal courts and 
lost.155
Federal appellate court judge Frank Easterbrook, a Ronald Reagan presidential 
appointee, indicated that no federal or state court had ever held that the First 
Amendment barred regulation of coordination between campaign committees and 
issue advocacy groups.156 Nor had any federal or state court held that the First 
Amendment forbid an inquiry into that topic.157 Ultimately, the targets of the 
investigation shifted to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. This brings us to Wisconsin’s 
third major money in politics scandal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court scandal.
C. The Wisconsin Supreme Court Scandal
The Wisconsin Supreme Court scandal does not refer to a single event, but rather
involved the elections of a number of the court’s justices and the conduct of those 
justices. The story begins in 2007 when an open seat on the court led to a campaign 
unprecedented in the amount of money spent, particularly the amount of dark 
money.158 The interest groups and the candidates spent nearly $6 million on the 
campaign.159 This amount was over four times more than had ever been spent on a 
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state supreme court campaign, and the special interest groups far outspent the 
candidates.160 For example, WMC spent an estimated $2.2 million, and WiCFG spent
an estimated $400,000.161 Most of the special interest money was spent on sham issue 
ads.162
Elected to the court was trial court judge Annette Ziegler.163 After the election, the 
Judicial Commission, which is responsible for monitoring judicial conduct, charged
Ziegler with misconduct for ruling on cases in which her husband had a financial 
interest.164 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reprimanded Ziegler and fined her $10,000, 
making her the first justice in history to be so punished.165
The 2008 Wisconsin Supreme Court election was worse.166 Several years prior,
Governor Jim Doyle appointed Wisconsin’s first African-American supreme court 
justice, Louis Butler.167 After Butler’s appointment, the court would occasionally split 
4–3 in favor of plaintiffs on civil liability issues, as it did in a case involving medical 
malpractice168 and another involving the liability of manufacturers of lead paint.169 As 
a result, WMC and other business groups made defeating Butler a priority.170
Naturally, WMC was unconcerned about the problems created by high-spending 
judicial campaigns funded primarily by dark money.171 Rather, its focus was on 
ensuring that a majority of the court’s members shared its position on civil liability 
issues and others that it regarded as important.172 Thus, an obscure trial court judge 
and former prosecutor, Michael Gableman, was recruited to run against Butler.173 In 
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the Butler/Gableman election, WMC spent an estimated $1.7 million on sham issue 
ads, and WiCFG spent an estimated $507,000.174
The special interest group ads mostly accused Butler of being soft on crime.175
This, of course, was not WMC’s real concern,176 but crime made for more compelling 
television ads than civil liability issues. Gableman’s ads likewise charged Butler with 
being soft on crime.177
One of Gabelman’s ads was so misleading that the Judicial Commission charged 
him with misconduct based on the ad’s “reckless disregard for the truth.”178
Specifically, the ad attacked work that Butler did during his pre-judicial career as a 
criminal defense attorney.179 It told viewers that Louis Butler worked “to put criminals 
back on the street”180 and misleadingly implied that Butler had been responsible as a 
judge for the release of a repeat child molester.181 Notwithstanding the dishonesty of 
Gableman’s commercial, the attack ads run by his campaign, WMC, and WiCFG
succeeded, and Butler became the first incumbent justice since 1967 to lose at the 
polls.182 As for the misconduct charge against Gableman, the court deadlocked 3–3.
Justices David Prosser, Patience Roggensack, and Annette Ziegler supported
Gableman and enabled him to avoid sanction for misconduct.183 And the service of 
Wisconsin’s first African-American supreme court justice was short-lived.
It was later discovered that Gableman received two years of free legal counsel on 
his defense of the Judicial Commission’s misconduct charge from a law firm that 
regularly appeared before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.184 In ten cases in which the 
firm appeared during that period, Gableman recused himself just once.185 In addition, 
Gableman did not disclose his receipt of free legal services.186 Rather, a lawyer 
appearing in a case before the Supreme Court discovered the potential conflict.187 The 
arrangement between Gableman and the law firm arguably created the appearance of 
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a quid pro quo, and it is well-established that a judge must disqualify himself if his
impartiality can reasonably be questioned.188
In 2009, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court jettisoned the recusal rule.189 In 
a 4–3 vote, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, Ziegler, and Gableman weakened the basis 
for recusal by adopting word for word a proposal submitted by WMC and the 
Wisconsin Realtors Association.190 The adopted proposal provided that campaign 
contributions to a justice or independent expenditures on a justice’s behalf do not 
require recusal.191 The dissenting opinion emphasized that the court’s integrity was at 
stake and that “judges must be perceived as beyond price.”192 Justice Roggensack 
defended the court’s action, arguing that because the judiciary is elected, requiring a 
justice to recuse herself because of a conflict of interest would diminish the 
significance of her supporters’ votes.193 Soon after, in another 4–3 vote, the same four 
justices ruled that a justice’s decision not to recuse was final and could not be reviewed 
by the rest of the court.194
In 2011, Justice Prosser ran for re-election and was opposed by an assistant 
attorney general.195 Again, the campaign involved enormous spending by outside 
groups, including $1.1 million on sham issue ads by WMC and $520,000 by 
WiCFG.196 Prosser was re-elected, but he was soon back in the headlines.197 In March 
2012, the Judicial Commission filed ethics violations charges against him based on an
incident that occurred in June 2011.198 He allegedly placed his hands on the neck of 
another justice, Ann Walsh Bradley, and subjected her to a chokehold.199 The 
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Commission appointed a special prosecutor to pursue the charges.200 The charges also
included an allegation that Prosser had “‘demonstrated a tendency toward lack of 
proper decorum and civility’ because he had called Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson 
a ‘total bitch’ . . . .”201 The Commission asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to send 
the case to a panel of appeals court judges to determine whether Prosser had violated 
three ethics rules.202 The court, however, did nothing. Like Gableman, Prosser avoided 
sanctions.203
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to take action on the Judicial 
Commission’s complaints against Gableman and Prosser, it did take action against the 
chairman of the Commission. In May 2012, the four justice majority voted to block 
the reappointment of retired Milwaukee lawyer, John Dawson, as chairman.204 This 
decision represented a departure from the court’s long-standing practice of retaining 
appointees who were eligible for reappointment and whose service was satisfactory.205
The committee in charge of nominating members of the Judicial Commission had 
previously urged the court to reappoint Dawson and praised his “leadership skills.”206
Finally, in 2013, Justice Roggensack was re-elected with the assistance of 
$850,000 in expenditures on sham issue ads by WMC and $350,000 by WiCFG.207
Even though Roggensack’s victory ensured that the ideological make-up of the court 
would remain unchanged, Roggensack and her allies were not satisfied.208 They 
hatched a scheme to remove eighty-one-year-old Shirley Abrahamson as the court’s 
chief justice.209 On the surface, the scheme made little sense because the position of 
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chief justice confers only modest administrative powers.210 However, proponents of 
the change could not abide the liberal Abrahamson and sought to amend the state 
constitution to enable the justices to elect the chief justice.211 For 126 years, the longest 
serving member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court automatically became the chief
justice, but Roggensack and her allies were certain that with their 4–3 majority, they 
could remove Abrahamson through an election.212
Accordingly, Roggensack lobbied legislators and urged them to support the 
amendment.213 Her behavior inspired one observer to refer to her as the “Lady 
MacBeth” of the court because the likelihood that she would replace Abrahamson as 
chief justice in an election among the justices made her lobbying look Shakespearean:
the younger justice trying to kill the queen.214 In contrast, Abrahamson desisted from 
lobbying and tried to avoid politicizing the court.215 Once the amendment passed the 
legislature and needed voter approval, WMC sprang into action. WMC launched a
$600,000 advertising blitz in support of the amendment.216 WMC’s money was critical
because no grassroots support for the amendment existed.217 Registrants for the 
amendment included WMC and former justice Jon Wilcox, whose own campaign was 
fined $10,000 for the same type of illegal campaign coordination that was at issue in 
the investigation pending before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.218 In fact, Wilcox’s 
case established the Wisconsin precedent that coordination with outside groups was 
illegal.219
Given WMC’s financial support, voters unsurprisingly supported the amendment, 
although they did so narrowly.220 When Abrahamson challenged the retroactive aspect 
of the amendment in federal court221—proponents of the amendment were unwilling 
to wait until the end of her term for it to take effect—the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
ran a story with the droll headline, “Will the Real Chief Justice Please Stand.”222 While 
Abrahamson made no statements to the press, Roggensack, who had been elected chief
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justice, called into a talk radio show and criticized both Abrahamson and the 
newspaper.223
As chief justice, two of Roggensack’s first actions were to close the procedure for 
appointing members to the Judicial Commission to the public and to fill a vacancy on 
the Commission with Joe Olson, a Republican operative who was sanctioned and 
excoriated by a three-judge federal court in a suit challenging the legislature’s
gerrymandering of electoral districts to favor Republicans.224
Thus, like the caucus scandal and the campaign coordination scandal, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court scandal has harmed the reputation of one of the three 
branches of Wisconsin’s government. Lincoln Caplan, a writer who has closely 
followed the court, observed that a decade-long saga of money-fueled elections has
transformed it from “one of the nation’s most respected state tribunals into a 
disgraceful mess.”225 He pointed out that the absence of effective campaign finance 
regulation has turned Wisconsin judicial campaigns into a grubby embarrassment to 
good government.226 He also noted that the integrity of the justices that made up the 
majority on the court was “compromised, as plainly as if they had personally solicited 
every dollar that helped elect them.”227
D.  The Campaign Coordination and the Wisconsin Supreme Court Scandals 
Intersect
As previously mentioned, WiCFG, WMC, and other targets of the campaign 
coordination investigation involving the Governor’s recall election wanted to shut the 
investigation down.228 After failing to succeed in this effort in federal court, they
brought the matter to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.229 Thus, two of Wisconsin’s 
campaign finance scandals, the campaign coordination scandal and the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court scandal, intersected in a kind of perfect storm.
Initially, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to hear any oral arguments in the 
case, either in public or in a closed courtroom.230 Justice Abrahamson dissented from 
this decision, stating that she found it both “highly unusual” and “alarming.”231
Thus, the campaign coordination case went behind closed doors for consideration
by four justices elected with the assistance of massive ad buys by WiCFG and 
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WMC,232 both of which were parties to the case.233 The prosecutors in charge of the 
investigation asked Justices Prosser and Gableman to recuse themselves, arguing that 
the justices’ ability to fairly rule on a case that involved parties largely responsible for 
their own elections could reasonably be questioned.234 In addition, a number of 
distinguished legal ethicists as well as prominent public interest organizations, such 
as the James Madison Center for Free Speech, The Ethics and Public Policy Center, 
and The Brennan Center for Justice, argued that the United States Constitution 
required the justices to recuse themselves.235
The argument in support of recusal was roughly as follows: WiCFG, WMC, and 
their offshoots spent millions of dollars in support of Prosser’s election, approximately 
five times as much as the Prosser campaign itself spent in an election that was decided 
by about seven thousand votes.236 In support of Gableman’s election, WMC spent 
some five and a half times the amount that Gableman’s own campaign spent, and 
WiCFG also surpassed the Gableman campaign’s spending.237 Gableman prevailed in 
his election by about twenty thousand votes.238 The closeness of these elections 
indicated that in the absence of WMC’s and WiCFG’s heavy political spending, 
Justices Prosser and Gableman would not have prevailed. In addition, the justices had 
a personal stake in the outcome of the case since a decision closing the investigation 
into campaign coordination would make it easier for WiCFG and WMC to support the 
justices in future campaigns. Nevertheless, relying on the recusal rule that the court 
had previously adopted, the justices declined to recuse themselves.239
Then, on July 16, 2015, in a 4–2 decision—Justice Ann Walsh Bradley recused 
herself because her son was a member of a law firm participating in the case240—the 
court closed the investigation into unlawful campaign coordination and declared that 
any coordination that occurred did not violate the law since it only involved issue 
ads.241 The court did not address the fact that the prosecutor was also looking into the 
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matter of Walker’s campaign coordination with groups engaged in express 
advocacy.242 Again in dissent, Justice Abrahamson called the majority’s decision “an 
unprecedented and faulty interpretation of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law and of 
the First Amendment.”243 Also dissenting, Justice Patrick Crooks stated that the 
majority’s analysis of the campaign finance issue was flawed and “will profoundly 
affect the integrity of our electoral process.”244
As a result of the court’s ruling, candidates, including the justices who decided the 
case, can permissibly work hand-in-glove with “independent” groups that take 
unlimited, secret donations as long as they only coordinate regarding issue ads.245 The 
effect of the court’s decision is to render Wisconsin’s post-Watergate contribution 
limits and public disclosure requirements applicable to candidates meaningless. 
Quoting Judge Easterbrook, Justice Abrahamson wrote, “[i]f campaigns tell potential 
contributors to divert money to nominally independent groups that have agreed to do 
the campaigns’ bidding, these contribution limits become porous, and the requirement 
that politicians’ campaign committees disclose the donors and amounts become 
useless.”246
The Campaign Legal Center, a non-partisan body which seeks to strengthen the 
public’s voice in the political arena, characterized the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
opinion as an “absurdity” and declared that the court had abdicated its “responsibility 
to engage in reasoned judicial review of the laws at issue.”247 It further stated:
A fundamental precept of judicial decision-making is that a court should 
analyze the past precedents that most closely resemble the case at bar to 
render a decision . . . . [T]he [United States Supreme] Court has been 
unwavering in distinguishing between expenditure restrictions and 
contribution restrictions . . . . It has also been steadfast in supporting the 
theory that “all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent 
of the candidate,” i.e., coordinated expenditures, should be treated as 
“disguised contributions” subject to limitation and disclosure . . . . It is thus 
inexplicable that the Wisconsin court decided a constitutional case about 
coordinated spending without analyzing—or even referencing—a single 
[United States] Supreme Court case about coordinated spending.248
Another commentator wrote that the court’s decision “is erroneous under federal 
precedent and fundamentally misunderstands the Supreme Court’s holdings 
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distinguishing between independent spending and spending coordinated with a 
candidate.”249 The writer further noted that “the [Wisconsin Supreme] Court’s 
reasoning lacked a coherent basis or a foundation in federal case law,” and that the 
immediate effect of the decision would be to render Wisconsin’s regulatory scheme 
“inoperable” and to make contribution limits “meaningless.”250 Thus, the court’s 
handling of the campaign coordination issue not only destroyed one of the few 
important remaining provisions of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law, but signified 
the further decline of a once respected judicial body.
One further aspect of the court’s handling of the campaign coordination case 
requires mention. For unknown reasons, the court was extremely concerned about the 
possibility that the evidence that the prosecutors had uncovered might be disclosed to 
someone.251 So fearful was the court that when the prosecutors who wished to seek 
review of the decision in the United States Supreme Court asked for permission to 
show the evidence to their lawyers so that they could prepare a certiorari petition, the 
court refused.252 As a result of this unbelievable decision, the prosecutors had to file 
their petition to the United States Supreme Court pro se.253
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V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The Wisconsin legislature, as presently constituted, is unlikely to embark on a 
constructive reform of state campaign finance law. It recently enacted legislation that 
doubled the amount that donors can contribute to candidates, allowed corporations to 
give unlimited amounts to political parties and campaign committees, and eliminated 
the requirement that contributors identify their employer.254 Worse, it codified the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision authorizing candidates to coordinate with 
advocacy groups that sponsor issue ads.255 No other state that limits contributions in 
elections allows such coordination.256
Thus, those who would like Wisconsin to be a model good government state once 
again have no alternative but to think about the long term. Ultimately, the Wisconsin 
legislature needs to enact a new campaign finance reform statute that, among other 
things, regulates sham issue ads and creates a robust system of partial public funding. 
For such a statute to survive a constitutional challenge, however, the United States 
Supreme Court will have to change direction on the issue of campaign finance reform 
legislation. When Justice Scalia was on the court, five justices took a single-mindedly 
libertarian view of the First Amendment.257 The approach of these justices was one 
dimensional.258 Their view tilted the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence heavily 
in favor of the rich and powerful and further contributed to undermining democracy 
in Wisconsin and elsewhere.259
As Wisconsin’s experience indicates, one essential reform is to ensure that sham 
issue ads are regulated like other political advertisements. If such a reform were 
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adopted, many, if not most, sham issue ads would disappear. Yet, in a 5–4 decision in 
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,260 the United States Supreme Court announced a 
standard that makes such regulation difficult. The Court stated that an issue ad can be 
regulated consistent with the First Amendment only if it “is susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate” and that the context of the ad should not play a “significant role” in the 
analysis.261 This approach seems perversely unconnected to reality. Few, if any, issue 
ads have any purpose other than to influence votes, and few involve any discussion of 
issues that is not entirely incidental to the goal of electing a candidate. More accurate 
is Justice Souter’s statement in dissent that “the line between ‘issue’ broadcasts and 
outright electioneering [is] a patent fiction.”262
The United States Supreme Court has also made creating an effective public 
funding system more difficult. The court has constrained legislatures from establishing 
any kind of rescue fund for candidates who, because of heavy spending by privately 
financed candidates or independent committees, are placed at a substantial financial 
disadvantage.263 In Davis v. FEC,264 another 5–4 decision, the Court struck down the 
Millionaires Amendment, which increased contribution limits for House candidates 
facing self-financed opponents who spent more than $350,000 of their own money.265
The Court held that the law impermissibly burdened wealthy candidates.266 Also, in
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Pac v. Bennett,267 the Court invalidated a 
statute that provided additional funds up to a certain amount to publicly financed 
candidates facing big spending by privately financed opponents.268
Overturning the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence obviously will not occur 
overnight. But as John Gardner once said, “[r]eform isn’t for the short winded.”269
Someday, a future president will appoint justices who are open to campaign finance 
reform.270 Constitutional scholars have developed a rich set of alternative 
understandings of the First Amendment which would allow reasonable regulation of 
money in politics consistent with the Constitution, American history, and democratic 
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values.271 Waiting in the wings are well-thought-out approaches that would provide 
political spending with significant First Amendment protection and would, at the same 
time, accommodate competing constitutional values such as electoral integrity and 
political equality.272
Signs indicate that as the result of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United273 and the large sums of money that special interest groups are 
spending to elect their favored candidates, the public has become increasingly aware 
of the need to do something to contain campaign spending.274 Possibly, the idea has 
begun to take hold that if governmental bodies in the United States are to function 
democratically and in the public interest, campaign finance laws must be dramatically 
reformed. Those who have reached that conclusion need only point to the state of 
Wisconsin to prove their case.
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